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Civil R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - R E M E D I E ~ - R E I N ~ T A T E M E N T  S A REMEDY IN SECTION 
1983 ACTIONS-Burton v. Cascade School District Union High 
School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 
(1975) 
In July, 1970, the principal of Cascade High School in Oregon 
confronted Peggy Burton, a nontenured teacher and supervisor of 
girls sports activities, with information that Burton was a homo- 
sexual. The information had been conveyed to the principal by 
the mother of one of Burton's students. When confronted with the 
allegations, Burton admitted to being a "practicing homosexual." 
She reiterated the admission a t  a special school board meeting 
held to discuss the allegation. The school board passed a resolu- 
tion to suspend Burton from her teaching position based on her 
admission. In order that the resolution might more closely comply 
with Oregon statutory requirements, it was later altered to read 
that the dismissal was for the "immorality" of being a practicing 
homosexual. ' 
Burton filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983* against the 
school board and the board officials personally, seeking a declara- 
tory judgment that her dismissal for being a practicing homosex- 
ual violated her civil rights. The suit also sought damages and 
reinstatement to her teaching position. 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
held that the dismissal was improper because the Oregon statute 
was unconstitutionally vague and awarded Burton the rest of the 
year's salary which she would have earned under her one-year 
contract, plus an additional half year's salary, and $750 for attor- 
ney fees and costs. The district court also ordered the defendants 
to expunge all references to the plaintiff's dismissal from the 
records of school board meetings and school personnel files. The 
1. Ch. 84, Ej 1, [I9691 Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 298, Ej 9, [I9731 Ore. Laws) 
provided for dismissal of teachers during the period of contract only for, inter alia, im- 
morality. The statute, as applied to probationary or nontenured teachers, has been re- 
placed by ORE. REV. STAT. Ej 342.835 (1974), which .provides for dismissal a t  any time 
during the probationary period or refusal to  renew a probationary teacher's contract at 
the end of the contract term, "for any cause deemed in good faith sufficient by the board." 
2. 42 U.S.C. Ej 1983 (1970) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri- 
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action a t  law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
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court refused, however, to order that she be reinstated to her 
teaching position." 
Burton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court should have 
granted reinstatement. The court of appeals, with one judge dis- 
senting, affirmed the judgment of the district court. 
Section 1983, the basis of Burton's suit, was enacted in 1871 
as an aid to the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The 
remedy provided by section 1983 for a deprivation of rights is civil 
liability "in an action at  law, suit in equity, or other proper pro- 
ceeding for redress."The cases that have construed and applied 
the section leave no doubt that both damages' and equitable 
relieP are appropriate remedies. Reinstatment is an equitable 
3. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 
(D. Ore. 19731, aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975). 
4. CONG. GI.ORE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1871) (remarks of Mr. Shellabarger). 
5. 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 (1970), quoted in full in note 2 supra. 
6. See, e.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Cotton Plant School Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1973); Wall 
v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Chase v. Fall Mountain 
Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, reu'd in part on other grounds, sub nom. Sostre v. 
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Lucia v. Duggan, 
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). 
7. E.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cotton Plant School 
Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1973); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58,477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Fisher v. 
Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 
1972); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); Rolfe v. 
County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 
1967); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board 
of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th 
Cir. 1966); Franklin v. County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966); Vega v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 385 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661 (D. 
Ida. 1974); Bradley v. Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Seaman v. Spring 
Lake Park Independent School Dist. No. 16, 363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973); Doherty 
v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Chase v. Fall Mountain Reg. School Dist., 
330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Com- 
munity School Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 
1972); Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Sostre v. 
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 
s u b  nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 
(1972); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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r e m e d ~ ; ~  as such, it will be awarded only if the plaintiff can show 
that his remedy a t  law is inadequate? Further, the award of rein- 
statement remains discretionary with the trial judge, who may 
weigh the advantages and inconveniences to both parties in deter- 
mining whether to make the award? 
A. Nature of the  Right and its Effect on the  Remedy 
Although the courts, when fashioning equitable remedies in 
section 1983 actions, might be expected to follow traditional prin- 
ciples of equity," the nature of the right alleged to have been 
violated appears to result in some deviation from those principles. 
In numerous recent cases, the courts have awarded reinstatement 
without discussing the adequacy of other remedies and without 
reference to the discretionary nature of the award of reinstate- 
ment. In these cases, consisting principally of instances where 
dismissal was racially motivated,'* or where dismissal came in 
retaliation for exercise of free expression,'"he award of reinstate- 
ment has appeared automatic, if not mandatory.I4 In other cases, 
however, the courts, basing their decision on either the adequacy 
of another remedyf5 or their own discretion,"%ave denied rein- 
8. Jinks v. Mays, 464 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1972). 
9. Id. ; see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK N THE LAW OF REMEDIES 8 2.5, a t  57 (1973). 
10. D. DORBS, supra note 9; H. MCCIJNTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
B 23, at  49, 51, (j 144, a t  383 (2d ed. 1948). 
11. See Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d 452, 456-58 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton Plant School Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 
1973); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanly County 
Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th 
Cir. 1966); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); 
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Franklin v. 
County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966). 
13. See, e.g., Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center 
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Karp v. 
Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 
728 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
1003 (1967); Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Lucia 
v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). 
14. The right of association has, in many instances, been redressed similarly. See, 
e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Wright v. Southeast Ala. Gas Dist., 
376 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973); 
Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Hanover 
Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. 
Ind. 1970). 
15. See Knowles v. Board of Public Instruction, 405 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1969). 
16. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
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statement despite the fact that dismissal constituted a violation 
of constitutionally protected rights. 
B. Judicial Discretion in Section 1983 Actions 
Courts may generally exercise discretion to grant or withhold 
equitable relief. In deciding how to exercise that discretion they 
normally balance the competing interests of the parties. In sec- 
tion 1983 actions, however, the courts have occasionally indicated 
that  certain interests opposing the award of equitable relief 
should not be weighed in the balancing process.I7 One factor the 
courts have sometimes refused to consider in the balancing pro- 
cess is the antagonism reinstatement may generate. For example, 
in Bradley v. Cothern,IR after ordering reinstatement for a teacher 
who had been terminated for failure to comply with maternity 
leave policies, the court said, "Although it is true that reinstating 
Mrs. Bradley to the District might revive some antagonisms, it 
is clear that this would not be a proper basis for denying such 
relief."IH In Sterzing u. Fort Bend Independent School Di~ t r i c t ,~"  
the district court refused to grant reinstatement even though a 
teacher's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been vio- 
lated, based in part on the finding that reinstatement of the 
teacher would only revive  antagonism^.^' The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed, finding the possible revival of antagonism to 
be an incorrect legal standard upon which to base the denial of 
reinstatement .22 
Generally speaking, however, the appellate courts have rec- 
ognized the trial courts' discretion in suits for reinstatement or 
other equitable relief. Further, they have accepted a wide range 
of considerations as proper for the balancing process. For exam- 
ple, in Abeyta u.  Town of T a ~ s , ~ V h e  T nth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of reinstatement to a 
17. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Supreme Court reversed 
a lower court decision that denied relief to a plaintiff who had been refused service in a 
restaurant because he was in the company of blacks. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, said, "The protection of constitutional rights may not be 
watered down because some members of the public actively oppose the exercise of consti- 
tutional rights by others." Id. a t  234. Since Adickes, lower court decisions have reflected 
,Justice Brennan's point of view. 
18. 384 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Tex. 1974). 
19. Id. a t  1224 n.17 (citation omitted). 
20. 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974). 
21. Id. a t  663. 
22. 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974). 
23. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974). 
53 11 CASE NOTES 535 
police officer who had been dismissed from the force in violation 
of statutory procedures. The court said: 
This decision was a matter within its discretion and will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. 
. . . .  
Finally we believe reinstatement with back wages would 
impose a considerable burden on the town of Taos, whose ac- 
tions were in good faith. Equitable relief should not be granted 
where the hardship to the defendant substantially outweighs the 
benefit to the plaintiff .24 
In Knowles v. Board of Public Instr~ction,~"he Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in denying a black teacher's request to be trans- 
ferred to an integrated school subject to an integration order, 
stated: 
Even if we were to consider this case as a proceeding under 
the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C.A. 9 1983, the trial court has 
broad power to grant or deny the equitable relief sought. We 
conclude, therefore, that on the state of the record, it was not 
error for the trial court to deny the individual injunctive relief 
sought by the a~pe l l an t .~"  
Also, in Brown v. Board of Education of Chicago,2i the court, in 
denying an injunction requiring the school board to spend as 
much money on minority and poor students as i t  was spending 
on white students, quoted with approval from the plurality opin- 
ion of Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. K u r t ~ m a n : ~ ~  
[I]n constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable reme- 
dies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and 
what is workable. . . . 
. . . .  
In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes 
and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably 
involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding 
that those interests have constitutional roots.29 
24. Id. at 328 (footnote omitted). 
25. 405 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1969). 
26. Id. at 1207 (footnote omitted). 
27. 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
28. 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
29. Id. at 200-01 (footnote omitted). Though the equitable remedy requested in 
Knowles, Brown, and Lemon was an injunction, reinstatement is also an equitable remedy 
to which the same principles are applicable. 
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C. The Void - for- Vagueness Doctrine 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine rest on the cases of Inter- 
national Harvester Co. of America v. KentuckyyJ0 and Connally 
v. General Construction C O . ~ ~  The Supreme Court announced 
in Connally that a statute "so vague that men of common intelli- 
gence must necessarily guess a t  its meaning and differ as to its 
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."32 
The leading Supreme Court case dealing with dismissal of a 
teacher under a vague statute is Keyishian v. Board of Re- 
gents.V'here the Court found a statute providing for dismissal 
of teachers who violated a prohibition on the utterance of "trea- 
s o n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  or "seditious" statements in the classroom to be uncon- 
stitutionally vague." Teachers, the Court said, could not be sure 
that mere academic discussion of ideas repugnant to the com- 
munity's concepts of government might not result in dismissal. 
The atmosphere thus created by the statute had a chilling effect 
on free speech and freedom of academic inq~i ry .~"  
Burton, in her appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
claimed her dismissal was unconstitutional in four respects: 
(1) the statute upon which it was based was unconstitutionally 
vague; (2) it was violative of due process because of the school 
board's failure to show a rational nexus between immoral conduct 
and job fitness; (3) it was violative of equal protection because 
no "compelling governmental interest" had been shown for dis- 
criminating against homosexuals as a class; and (4) it was viola- 
tive of her right to privacy inasmuch as her sexual orientation 
could not legitimately be made a criterion for public employ- 
ment .:16 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment 
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague,37 but did not ad- 
30. 234 U.S. 216 (1914). 
31. 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
32. Id. a t  391. 
33. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
34. Id. a t  604. The statute was also found to be overbroad. Id. a t  609-10. 
35. Id. a t  603-04. 
36. Brief for Appellant a t  3, Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 
5 ,  512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975). 
37. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975). 
The district court said that the dangers of such vagueness were: (1) the statute could 
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dress itself to the other alleged constitutional violations. It also 
affirmed the district court's denial of reinstatement, citing five 
reasons for its affirmance. First, because Burton was not a ten- 
ured teacher, she had no property right or expectation of reem- 
ployment that required protection? Second, the nature of the 
right sought to be vindicated did not warrant reinstatement.:'" 
Third, it was within the trial judge's discretion to refuse to rein- 
state the plaintiff. The balancing of possible disruption to the 
school, community, and other teachers against plaintiffs inter- 
ests in completing her one-year contract was a justifiable exercise 
of the court's discretion, despite the fact that reinstatement has 
commonly been granted in cases where dismissal was based upon 
racial discrimination or exercise of First Amendment rights."' 
Fourth, the award of money damages adequately compensated 
Burton for her wrongful di~missal.~'  Fifth, the award of declara- 
tory relief and monetary damages had sufficient admonitory ef- 
fect upon the school district to deter it from similar acts in the 
future? Judge Lumbard, in his dissent, took issue with all five 
reasons advanced by the majority? 
In determining whether to grant Burton's request for rein- 
statement, the court dealt primarily with three issues: the signi- 
ficance of the right which had been violated; the adequacy of 
the remedy to redress the violated right; and the extent, if any, 
to which the court should "balance the equities" involved. 
be so broadly applied as to subject every teacher in the state to discipline; (2) a potential 
for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement inheres in such a statute; (3) i t  makes the 
school board the arbiters of morality for the entire community; (4) i t  subjects the liveli- 
hood of every teacher in the state to the irrationality and irregularity of such judgments; 
(5) it fails to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited; and (6) it permits erratic 
and prejudicial exercise of authority. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School 
No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd,  512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 
S. Ct. 69 (1975). 
, Id. 
38. 512 F.2d a t  852 n.1, 854. 
39. The court said: 
In this case, however, the nature of the constitutional right sought to be 
vindicated is not such as to compel reinstatement frequently ordered in response 
to racially motivated dismissals, or to those aimed a t  punishing the exercise of 
free speech. 
~t 853 n.3. 
40. Id. at  852-53. 
41. Id. at  853-54. 
42. Id. at  854. 
43. Id. at  854-56. 
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A. Significance of the Nature of  the  Violated Right 
As previously indicated, violation of a certain class of consti- 
tutional rights is almost automatically redressed by reinstate- 
ment, whereas the violation of other kinds of rights triggers the 
application of traditional principles of equity to determine the 
appropriateness of rein~tatement.~Weprivation f rights to reem- 
ployment, a property right, fall in the former class,%s do dis- 
missals based on race or exercise of free speech r i g h t ~ . ~ W u e  pro- 
cess violations, on the other hand, have not been accorded such 
unanimous treatment with regard to re in~ ta tement .~~  Thus, in a 
given case, the right which has been violated may ,determine 
whether reinstatement is granted. 
Of the four rights alleged by Burton to have been violated, 
the court focused almost entirely on the first, the right to due 
process, which the court held the school district had violated 
because the dismissal was pursuant to a vague statute. The dis- 
sent, however, argued that Burton's expectation of reemployment 
may have constituted a property right, the violation of which 
requires reinstatement? 
1. Property right 
The majority of the court found that Burton's lack of tenure 
was dispositive of the property right question." This position is 
supported by Board of Regents v. R ~ t h , ~ "  which held that a non- 
tenured teacher, with no claim to a university rule or policy 
amounting to tenure, has no property right to reemployment. 
Nevertheless, the dissent in the instant case correctly points 
out that lack of formal tenure is not necessarily determinative of 
the property right question. The Supreme Court in Perry v. 
SindermannH and in Roth indicated that where university rules 
or policies provide for renewal of teaching contracts in the ab- 
sence of sufficient cause for termination, or where university offi- 
cials have by their words or actions implied that something akin 
to a contractual agreement to tenure exists, a property right wor- 
44. See notes 11-16 and accompanying text supra. 
45. Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Ida. 1974). 
46. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. 
47. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra. 
48. 512 F.2d at 855. 
49. Id. at 852. A tenured teacher has a property right which is protected by due 
process. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
50. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
51. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
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thy of protection by due process safeguards must be recognized." 
In an effort to establish a protectable property interest, the dis- 
sent in the instant case makes a novel argument based upon an 
extension of the reasoning of Roth and Perry. An Oregon statutex:' 
would have compelled school officials to furnish Burton with a 
written reason for nonrenewal a t  the end of her contract if they 
chose not to rehire her. This requirement, together with the judi- 
cially created principle that no constitutionally impermissible 
reason may be given for ter rn inat i~n,~~emonst ra tes  that Burton 
had rights beyond her one-year contract." These rights, the dis- 
sent concluded, amount to a property right requiring due process 
protection? 
Judge Lumbard's novel argument fails for two reasons. First, 
even if one assumes that Burton did have additional rights be- 
yond her one-year contract, it is doubtful that they rise to the 
dignity of a protected property interest. The statutory require- 
ment to furnish written reasons for nonrenewal of a teacher's 
contract is far from the kind of implied tenure that the Supreme 
Court in Perry indicated might create a property right." Further, 
the argument that the statute requiring in writing a constitution- 
ally acceptable reason for nonrenewal creates a property right in 
Burton cannot be supported by authority. Cases dealing with the 
acceptability of reasons for dismissal or nonrenewal have not de- 
scribed or treated the right involved as a substantive property 
right. Rather, it has been characterized as a right to procedural 
due process-a right not to be dismissed in an unfair fashion? 
52. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 209 (1971). 
53. ORE. REV. STAT. Ej 342.513(1) (1974) (formerly designated ORE. REV. STAT. § 
342.635). 
54. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960). 
55. 512 F.2d at 855. 
56. Id.; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Perry v. Sinder- 
mann, 408 U.S. 593,599-603 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207,207-08 (1971). 
57. There, the defendant college's official Faculty Guide provided: 
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of 
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as 
long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooper- 
ative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy 
in his work. 
408 U.S. 593,600 (1972). Furthermore, in Perry, guidelines promulgated by the Coordinat- 
ing Board of the Texas College and University System provided additional reassurances 
of continued employment in the plaintiffs circumstances. Id. a t  600-01 n.6. 
58. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Chase v. 
Fall Mountain Reg. School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971). See generally Langford 
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2. Statute void for vagueness 
Since, in the majority view, no property interest was invaded 
by the dismissal, the only constitutional infraction was the dis- 
missal pursuant to a vague statute declared void by the court. 
The majority felt that such a violation, standing alone, did not 
compel the award of reinstatement, although dismissals violative 
of other rights might well have compelled such action." The dis- 
sent, on the other hand, argued that the dismissal on the basis of 
a vague statute, even though not accompanied by violations of 
other rights, was sufficient to compel reinstatement."' 
In determining whether dismissal under a vague statute com- 
pels reinstatement, an examination of the judicial treatment ac- 
corded violations of other types of due process rights is revealing. 
In several cases, teachers dismissed in violation of due process 
considerations were awarded reinstatementY It  is important to 
note, however, that in each of these cases the due process viola- 
tion was accompanied by a violation of some other constitutional 
right such as free speech or equal protection. This is true of the 
Suprerne Court case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents," where the 
Court indicated that the chilling effect of the statute on the exer- 
cise of free speech was almost as great as if the statute had ac- 
tually proscribed free expression in certain areas." "The danger 
of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment 
rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly 
inform teachers what is being p r~sc r ibed . "~~  
v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. 
No. 58,477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Buhr v. Buffalo School 
Dist. No. 39, 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973). 
59. 512 F.2d at 853 n.3. 
60. Id. at 855 n.1. 
61. See, e .g . ,  Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973) (English teacher dis- 
missed in violation of due process, but because of exercise of First Amendment rights); 
Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972) (teacher dismissed because of his 
civil rights activities-violation of due process found); Vega v. Civil Sew. Comm'n, 385 
F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corrections officer summarily dismissed in violation of due 
process and equal protection); Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661 (D. Ida. 1974) (ten- 
ured teacher discharged without a hearing-deprivation of a property right found); An- 
drews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973)' aff'd, 
507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), wrt. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (teacher's aid dismissed and 
another denied employment when it was discovered that they were the mothers of illegiti- 
mate children-violation of equal protection and due process found-injunction entered 
against operation of the rule which required dismissal under such circumstances); Lucia 
v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969) (teacher dismissed for wearing a beard- 
violation of due process found). 
62. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
63. Id. at 604. 
64. Id. (citations omitted). 
53 I] CASE NOTES 541 
Abeyta v. Town of Taosa supports the proposition that the 
courts in Keyishian and in other cases may have granted rein- 
statement because of the companion violation and not because of 
the procedural due process violation. In A beyta, the district court 
refused to grant reinstatement to  a city policy officer who had 
been dismissed in violation of statutory procedures. In denying 
reinstatement, the court referred to the fact that even though a 
technical violation of due process had occurred," the city had 
cause to fire the police officer." The court of appeals found that, 
in making such a determination, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion? 
The instant case is distinguishable from Keyishian and other 
due process cases where reinstatement was awarded"' in that the 
vagueness of the Oregon statute constituted, in the view of the 
majority, the only constitutional violation suffered by the plain- 
tiff.70 Because of this absence of a companion violation, the ra- 
tionale of Abeyta is arguably applicable. Although there was a 
violation of due process in the instant case, it is likely that had 
the statute defined "immorality" and required a nexus between 
conduct and job performance, thereby obviating constitutional 
objections, the school district might well have been able to justify 
the firing of Burton," just as the town of Taos was able to justify 
the firing of the police officer. The treatment given the procedural 
violation in Abeyta lends support to the comment by the majority 
in the present case that  the violation of some constitutional rights 
may not warrant reinstatement as a remedy.72 I t  also weakens the 
implication of the dissent that dismissals based upon a vague 
statute must be redressed by the same remedies granted in dis- 
missals based upon race or exercise of First Amendment rights.'" 
65. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974). 
66. Id. at  328. The dismissal was improper because there were not enough councilmen 
present a t  the meeting to constitute a quorum for voting purposes. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Cases cited note 61 supra. 
70. The court recognized, however, that it was not addressing all possible issues when 
it expressly stated that it would not pass on the question of whether Burton could be 
denied employment strictly on the basis of her homosexual inclinations. 512 F.2d a t  854 
n.5. 
71. See notes 102-118 and accompanying text infra. 
72. 512 F.2d a t  853 n.3. 
73. Id. at  855 n.1. 
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B. Adequacy o f  the Remedy 
After concluding that reinstatement was not compelled by 
the nature of the right violated, the court proceeded to analyze 
the adequacy of the other remedy granted. The court did this 
pursuant to established principles of equity that require, in the 
absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, examination of 
the adequacy of other remedies in order to determine the appro- 
priateness of awarding equitable relief.74 Three concepts were ex- 
amined with regard to the adequacy of the remedy in the instant 
case: (I) compensation; (2) deterrence; and (3) vindication. The 
court's treatment of the first concept, compensation, requires no 
analysis. The majority gave deference to the lower court's deci- 
sion that the award was sufficient to compensate Burton.'The 
dissent apparently agreed that the compensatory effect of the 
remedy was adequate. The second and third concepts, however, 
raise difficult issues. 
I .  Deterrence 
The majority again gave deference to the district court's de- 
cision that the money damages awarded Burton were sufficient 
to deter the school district from similar action in the future. Al- 
though no case authority was cited, the dissent asserted that the 
damages were insufficient as a deterrent to future  violation^.^^ 
When there is a possibility that a violation may recur in the 
future, courts have indicated that the remedy to be granted may 
be considered in light of its deterrent value. Indeed, where consti- 
tutional rights are involved, a remedy without a deterrent effect 
-- 
may be inadequate where continued violations are foreseeable.ll 
Obviously, however, no deterrent short of physical restraint can 
ensure that repeated violations will not occur. The deterrent fac- 
tor can only reduce the probability that a violation will be re- 
peated. 
Two questions concerned with probability are important in 
determining the necessity and scope of a deterrent in the remedy. 
First, is the probability of repeated violations great enough to 
warrant deterrence? Second, is the deterrent strong enough to 
- 
74. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
75. 512 F.2d a t  854. 
76. Id. a t  856. 
77. Cf. Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 159 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1946); Brown 
v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v. Pelzer Realty 
Co., 377 F. Supp. 121, 124 (M.D. Ala. 1974); D. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 7.4, a t  533. 
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minimize the probability tha t  such repeated violations will 
occur? As to the first question or inquiry, it should be noted that 
the school board acted in good faith. At the time of Burton's 
dismissal, the school board was operating under a 25-year old 
law7w that on its face did not require a nexus between immoral 
conduct and teaching effi~iency.'~ Further, following the proce- 
dure set forth in RothRo and Perry,R1 the school board provided a 
hearing a t  which Burton had the opportunity to refute the charge 
brought against her. These good faith efforts to proceed in a law- 
ful fashion suggest a low probability of repeated school board 
violations, which in turn indicates little or no need for a remedy 
fashioned primarily for its deterrent effect. 
Even if it is assumed, however, that a deterrent is necessary 
because of the possibility of future violations, the good faith of the 
school board may be considered in determining the strength of 
the deterrent required. In light of the inclination of the school 
district to proceed lawfully, the majority position-that a money 
judgment together with a declaration that the offensive statute 
is void constitutes sufficient deterrence-seems more reasonable 
than the objection of the dissent.R2 
2. Vindication 
It is somewhat difficult to articulate the distinction between 
compensating the plaintiff and vindicating the plaintiff's rights. 
Nevertheless, vindication implies something beyond merely re- 
turning the plaintiff to an equivalent positions and connotes tak- 
78. Respondent's Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari a t  4, Burton v. Cascade 
School Dist. Union High School No. 5, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975). 
79. Ch. 84, 9 1, [I9691 Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 298, 5 9, [I9731 Ore. Laws). 
80. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
81. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
82. The dissent stated: 
If a similar situation arises in the future it might well conclude that it would be 
willing to pay a few thousand dollars in order to be rid of an unwanted teacher. 
512 F.2d at 856. 
83. The remedy for breach of a contractual obligation is to compensate the injured 
party, but there is no legal stigma that attaches to the breaching party. The treatment of 
contractual breaches seems to indicate that as long as one is willing to compensate the 
injured party, one may breach a contract with impunity. This is not the case with, for 
instance, an invasion of privacy action. While plaintiff is compensated for his injury, 
defendant may also be forced to pay punitive damages. These punitive damages, as well 
as serving to deter future violations, indicate to all the world that a man's privacy cannot 
be invaded with impunity. Nominal damages in a tort action could also be said to be 
vindicatory because they certainly do not compensate or deter. They merely indicate that 
the plaintiff was right and the defendant was wrong. 
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ing vengeance for, or freeing from, questions of error, dishonor, 
guilt, or neg l igen~e .~~  Under this definition, reinstatement would 
be especially appropriate as vindication if the actions of the de- 
fendant tended to cast doubt on the validity of a right. 
The majority dismisses the issue of vindication without elab- 
oration: the present case does not involve the type of right that 
requires reinstatement for vindicat i~n.~" The dissent, however, 
indicates that vindication is a crucial issue: the adequacy of a 
remedy is determined by how well i t  vindicates the violated 
right!Witing Pred v. Board of Public Instructionu and Smith u. 
Hampton Training School for Nurses,88 the dissent argues that 
constitutional rights need to be vindicated in cases of unlawful 
dismissals and that they cannot be vindicated without reinstate- 
ment .x9 
The position of the majority appears more persuasive. Since 
Burton had no protectable property right," her only right suscep- 
tible to violation, and thus requiring vindication, was the right 
not to  be subject to the uncertainties and arbitrariness of a vague 
statute. I t  appears, however, that the court's other remedial ac- 
tion-declaring the s tatute  void-adequately vindicated that 
right by removing any doubt about its validity. Further, both 
cases cited by the  dissent to  buttress i ts argument involved 
violations that have customarily been redressed by reinstatement 
regardless of the adequacy of other available remedies."' In Pred, 
the court found that the dismissals were based upon the plain- 
tiff's exercise of First Amendment rights." In Smith, the dis- 
missal was based both on the plaintiffs' race and on their exercise 
of free e x p r e s ~ i o n . ~ ~  
C. Discretion of the Court 
Even if, as the dissent argues, vindication is necessary but 
lacking in the instant case, traditional equitable principles indi- 
- - 
84. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2553 (P. Grove ed. 1971). 
85. 512 F.2d a t  853 n.3. 
86. Judge Lumbard said, "The real issue is how best to vindicate Ms. Burton's 
rights." Id. a t  856. 
415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969). 
360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966). 
512 F.2d a t  856. 
See notes 49-58 and accompanying text supra. 
See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. 
415 F.2d a t  856. 
360 F.2d at 581. 
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cate that the award of an equitable remedy remains discretionary 
with the court. The court's discretion may be exercised to deny 
the relief if, after "balancing the equities," it is determined that 
the advantage to the plaintiff is small compared to the burden 
placed upon the defendant.94 
The court in the instant case discusses several issues with 
regard to the "balancing of the equities." First, was i t  proper to 
balance the equities in determining the appropriateness of rein- 
statement? Second, if balancing was appropriate, what factors 
should have been weighed? Third, what should have been the 
outcome of such a balancing test? 
1. Should the balancing test be used? 
The  majority, relying on Pred v. Board of Public 
Instruction," concludes that balancing is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  It is not 
entirely clear whether Judge Lumbard dissents on the grounds 
that any balancing is inappropriate or on the grounds that the 
district court inappropriately considered certain factors in the 
balancing process.97 
Traditional principles of equity provide that balancing is 
a c ~ e p t a b l e . ~ ~  Nevertheless, the majority's reliance on Pred, as the 
dissent correctly points out,9g is inapposite. &ed stands for the 
proposition that before First Amendment rights may be circum- 
scribed in the classroom, the interests of the teacher in free ex- 
pression must be weighed against the interests of the school in 
maintaining order and discipline.loO Balancing relevant inter- 
ests in order to determine whether the exercise of a constitutional 
right may be limited is quite different from balancing competing 
interests to determine whether an equitable remedy will be 
granted. The former will determine whether a violation exists; the 
latter presumes a violation of some interest and determines 
whether and how the violation will be remedied by equity. The 
factors needed to tip the scales in favor of a limitation on the 
exercise of free speech ought to be considerably more weighty 
than the factors necessary to outweigh plaintiffs interest in being 
reinstated after dismissal under a vague statute. In spite of the 
94. H.  MCCLINTOCK, supra note 10, 5 144, at 383. 
95. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969). 
96. 512 F.2d at 853. 
97. Id. at 855. 
98. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. 
99. 512 F.2d at 856 n.3. 
100. 415 F.2d at 859 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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fact that Pred is not supportive of the majority position, however, 
numerous other cases indicate that balancing of the equities in 
section 1983 actions is warranted.lol 
2. Factors which may be considered in the balancing process 
The court determined that it was not error to consider the 
possible disruption to the community should Burton be rein- 
stated? The dissent appears to object not so much to the use of 
a balancing process as to the consideration of community disrup- 
tion in that process.lo3 Judge Lumbard thus concludes that denial 
of reinstatement was an abuse of discretion. 
There is authority for the position of the dissent that, assum- 
ing balancing to be warranted, some types of adverse public reac- 
tion are not appropriately weighed.'" for example, the dissent 
cites Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Districtlo5 and 
Langford v. City of Texarkana.lo6 But the dissent fails to recog- 
nize that there is no per se rule prohibiting the consideration of 
community resentment resulting from reinstatement. Com- 
munity resentment is properly considered or disregarded by the 
courts depending on the "legitimacy"1o7 of that resentment. On 
this basis, the cases cited by the dissent are distinguishable from 
the present case. The community resentment disregarded in 
Sterzing was antagonism directed toward the exercise of First 
Amendment rights, particularly speech; in Langford, the com- 
munity resentment took the form of racial bias.lo8 In the present 
101. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v. 
Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. 
Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974); cf. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 219-20 (4th Cir. 
1972); Knowles v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 405 F.2d 1206, 1207 (5th Cir. 1969). 
102. 512 F.2d a t  853 & n.3. 
103. Id. a t  855-56. 
104. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 
1974); Langford v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1973); Bradley v. 
Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216, 1224 n.17 (E.D. Tex. 1974). 
105. 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974). 
106. 478 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1973). 
107. The words legitimacy and legitimate are used in a narrow sense in the text. If a 
particular community sentiment cannot be constitutionally enshrined in a legislative 
enactment, it is not "legitimate" and therefore not properly considered by a court address- 
ing the reinstatment issue. Such sentiments would include religious and racial bias and 
antagonism directed toward one espousing unpopular ideas. On the other hand, if a 
particular community sentiment may constitutionally find expression in legislation, a 
court may properly consider and weigh that "legitimate" sentiment. 
108. Rather than prohibiting the consideration of community disruption altogether, 
the courts may have determined that community disruption caused by reinstatement 
simply does not outweigh the serious consequences of failing to redress these important 
rights. 
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case, by way of contrast, the court anticipated that Burton's sta- 
tus as a practicing homosexual-rather than her racial status or 
her exercise of a constitutionally protected right such as 
speech-would engender community resentment. 
Strong arguments arise that community resentment directed 
toward the employment of a practicing homosexual as a public 
school teacher is legitimate and therefore worthy of judicial cog- 
nizance and consideration. Homosexuality, unlike race for exam- 
ple, is not a constitutionally protected status. Elimination of dis- 
crimination against homosexuality, unlike elimination of racial 
bias, is not a national priority of the highest order.log Indeed, in 
most states, homosexual acts are criminal.l1° Further, the expres- 
sion of antihomosexual sentiments in criminal statutes has been 
deemed a legitimate and not constitutionally infirm legislative 
exercise. 
Given the legitimacy of antihomosexual sentiments when 
expressed in other contexts, a court may not be justified in refus- 
ing to consider such sentiments or failing to anticipate com- 
munity resentment resulting from reinstatement. Where com- 
munity sentiments against homosexuality exist or can reasonably 
be anticipated, no persuasive reason appears for judicially disre- 
garding those sentiments in the balancing process attendant upon 
the fashioning of remedies. In short, i t  appears that the com- 
munity's antihomosexual sentiments were properly included in 
the balancing equation in the present case. 
3. Result of the balancing test 
Applying the balancing test, the majority concluded that 
denial of reinstatement was not an abuse of discretion.l12 The 
dissent disagreed, pointing out, probably correctly, that  com- 
munity disruption alone may not be sufficient to justify the de- 
nial of reinstatement in the instant case.l13 Other considerations, 
however, such as  the impairment of Burton's teaching effi- 
~ i e n c y , " ~  loss of public confidence in the school system, and the 
109. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual 
Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974). See also Comment, Homosexuality and the 
Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 84 (1973). 
110. See Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 
280-87 (1971). 
111. See, e.g., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971), vacating Buchanan v. Batche- 
lor, 308 F. Suppi 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
112. 512 F.2d at 852. 
113. Id. at 855-56. 
114. The court assumed that a diminution in teaching efficiency would result from 
548 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
availability of other employment, l i5  support the conclusion that 
the burden to the school district outweighs the interest of the 
plaintiff in being reinstated. Further, Burton's open acknowledg- 
ment of her homosexual status, although perhaps not amounting 
to advocacy of a lifestyle, arguably brings her case within the 
rationale of McConnell v. Anderson116 where the court upheld a 
school board's refusal to hire a homosexual librarian whose appli- 
cation with another male for a marriage license had been widely 
reported by the news media. The court felt that to require the 
school to hire the man would permit him "to foist tacit approval 
of this socially repugnant concept upon his employer."l17 
In conclusion, neither the district court nor the majority on 
the circuit court panel erred in balancing the competing interests. 
The impairment of the ability of Burton to be an effective teacher 
and the disruption to the orderly functioning of the school district 
in a n  atmosphere of community confidence, especially in light of 
the concern which courts have traditionally demonstrated for stu- 
dents and other impressionable groups,llS strongly counterbal- 
ances Burton's interest in reinstatement. 
the reluctance of parents to allow their children to be taught by Burton, reluctance of 
students to be taught by her, and reluctance of fellow teachers to work with her. 
115. Since all record of the reason for dismissal had been expunged from the records 
of the school, the actions of the school board had little chance of reducing Burton's ability 
to find new employment. 512 F.2d a t  852. 
116. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972). 
117. Id. a t  196. 
118. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 827, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 318, 323 (Ct. App. 1971); Safransky v. State Personnel Board, 62 Wis. 2d 464, 475- 
76, 215 N.W.2d 379, 384-85 (1974). 
